redis 5.0.5

6 files changed, 7 insertions, 294 deletions

diff --git a/database/redis/CLIENT_MASTER.patch b/database/redis/CLIENT_MASTER.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a762bc6a6..0000000000
--- a/database/redis/CLIENT_MASTER.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-Adapted from https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/e6f39338e6464fb29f630120d8949b0d535e2e3f.patch
-
---- src/config.c.orig	2014-12-16 03:18:20.000000000 -0500
-+++ src/config.c	2016-09-30 16:25:06.586589235 -0400
-@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
-     {NULL, 0}
- };
- 
--clientBufferLimitsConfig clientBufferLimitsDefaults[REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT] = {
-+clientBufferLimitsConfig clientBufferLimitsDefaults[REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT] = {
-     {0, 0, 0}, /* normal */
-     {1024*1024*256, 1024*1024*64, 60}, /* slave */
-     {1024*1024*32, 1024*1024*8, 60}  /* pubsub */
-@@ -1105,13 +1105,13 @@
-         sds buf = sdsempty();
-         int j;
- 
--        for (j = 0; j < REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT; j++) {
-+        for (j = 0; j < REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT; j++) {
-             buf = sdscatprintf(buf,"%s %llu %llu %ld",
-                     getClientTypeName(j),
-                     server.client_obuf_limits[j].hard_limit_bytes,
-                     server.client_obuf_limits[j].soft_limit_bytes,
-                     (long) server.client_obuf_limits[j].soft_limit_seconds);
--            if (j != REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT-1)
-+            if (j != REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT-1)
-                 buf = sdscatlen(buf," ",1);
-         }
-         addReplyBulkCString(c,"client-output-buffer-limit");
-@@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@
-     int j;
-     char *option = "client-output-buffer-limit";
- 
--    for (j = 0; j < REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT; j++) {
-+    for (j = 0; j < REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT; j++) {
-         int force = (server.client_obuf_limits[j].hard_limit_bytes !=
-                     clientBufferLimitsDefaults[j].hard_limit_bytes) ||
-                     (server.client_obuf_limits[j].soft_limit_bytes !=
---- src/networking.c.orig	2014-12-16 03:18:20.000000000 -0500
-+++ src/networking.c	2016-09-30 16:37:53.980349749 -0400
-@@ -1526,12 +1526,13 @@
-  * REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL -> Normal client
-  * REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_SLAVE  -> Slave or client executing MONITOR command
-  * REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB -> Client subscribed to Pub/Sub channels
-+ * REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER -> The client representing our replication master.
-  */
- int getClientType(redisClient *c) {
-+    if (c->flags & REDIS_MASTER) return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER;
-     if ((c->flags & REDIS_SLAVE) && !(c->flags & REDIS_MONITOR))
-         return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_SLAVE;
--    if (c->flags & REDIS_PUBSUB)
--        return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB;
-+    if (c->flags & REDIS_PUBSUB) return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB;
-     return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL;
- }
- 
-@@ -1539,6 +1540,7 @@
-     if (!strcasecmp(name,"normal")) return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL;
-     else if (!strcasecmp(name,"slave")) return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_SLAVE;
-     else if (!strcasecmp(name,"pubsub")) return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB;
-+    else if (!strcasecmp(name,"master")) return REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER;
-     else return -1;
- }
- 
-@@ -1547,6 +1549,7 @@
-     case REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL: return "normal";
-     case REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_SLAVE:  return "slave";
-     case REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB: return "pubsub";
-+    case REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER: return "master";
-     default:                       return NULL;
-     }
- }
-@@ -1562,6 +1565,10 @@
-     unsigned long used_mem = getClientOutputBufferMemoryUsage(c);
- 
-     class = getClientType(c);
-+    /* For the purpose of output buffer limiting, masters are handled
-+     * like normal clients. */
-+    if (class == REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER) class = REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL;
-+
-     if (server.client_obuf_limits[class].hard_limit_bytes &&
-         used_mem >= server.client_obuf_limits[class].hard_limit_bytes)
-         hard = 1;
---- src/redis.h.orig	2014-12-16 03:18:20.000000000 -0500
-+++ src/redis.h	2016-09-30 16:29:11.324284488 -0400
-@@ -261,7 +261,10 @@
- #define REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL 0 /* Normal req-reply clients + MONITORs */
- #define REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_SLAVE 1  /* Slaves. */
- #define REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB 2 /* Clients subscribed to PubSub channels. */
--#define REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT 3
-+#define REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER 3 /* Master. */
-+#define REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT 3 /* Number of clients to expose to output
-+                                          buffer configuration. Just the first
-+                                          three: normal, slave, pubsub. */
- 
- /* Slave replication state - from the point of view of the slave. */
- #define REDIS_REPL_NONE 0 /* No active replication */
-@@ -569,7 +572,7 @@
-     time_t soft_limit_seconds;
- } clientBufferLimitsConfig;
- 
--extern clientBufferLimitsConfig clientBufferLimitsDefaults[REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT];
-+extern clientBufferLimitsConfig clientBufferLimitsDefaults[REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];
- 
- /* The redisOp structure defines a Redis Operation, that is an instance of
-  * a command with an argument vector, database ID, propagation target
-@@ -685,7 +688,7 @@
-     size_t client_max_querybuf_len; /* Limit for client query buffer length */
-     int dbnum;                      /* Total number of configured DBs */
-     int daemonize;                  /* True if running as a daemon */
--    clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT];
-+    clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];
-     /* AOF persistence */
-     int aof_state;                  /* REDIS_AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */
-     int aof_fsync;                  /* Kind of fsync() policy */
---- src/redis.c.orig	2014-12-16 03:18:20.000000000 -0500
-+++ src/redis.c	2016-09-30 16:28:51.135397850 -0400
-@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@
-     server.repl_no_slaves_since = time(NULL);
- 
-     /* Client output buffer limits */
--    for (j = 0; j < REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_COUNT; j++)
-+    for (j = 0; j < REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT; j++)
-         server.client_obuf_limits[j] = clientBufferLimitsDefaults[j];
- 
-     /* Double constants initialization */
diff --git a/database/redis/CVE-2013-7458.patch b/database/redis/CVE-2013-7458.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ce3d2e91d9..0000000000
--- a/database/redis/CVE-2013-7458.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 9d524114eda67dedc38a9f97c9d5f3a5c3747829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: antirez <antirez@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 11:28:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Update linenoise to fix insecure redis-cli history file
- creation.
-
-The problem was fixed in antirez/linenoise repository applying a patch
-contributed by @lamby. Here the new version is updated in the Redis
-source tree.
-
-Close #1418
-Close #3322
----
- deps/linenoise/linenoise.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/deps/linenoise/linenoise.c b/deps/linenoise/linenoise.c
-index a807d9b..fce14a7 100644
---- a/deps/linenoise/linenoise.c
-+++ b/deps/linenoise/linenoise.c
-@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/ioctl.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-@@ -1160,10 +1161,14 @@ int linenoiseHistorySetMaxLen(int len) {
- /* Save the history in the specified file. On success 0 is returned
-  * otherwise -1 is returned. */
- int linenoiseHistorySave(const char *filename) {
--    FILE *fp = fopen(filename,"w");
-+    mode_t old_umask = umask(S_IXUSR|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO);
-+    FILE *fp;
-     int j;
- 
-+    fp = fopen(filename,"w");
-+    umask(old_umask);
-     if (fp == NULL) return -1;
-+    chmod(filename,S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
-     for (j = 0; j < history_len; j++)
-         fprintf(fp,"%s\n",history[j]);
-     fclose(fp);
diff --git a/database/redis/DETAILS b/database/redis/DETAILS
index 701cf5a138..e4e63cbcc9 100755
--- a/database/redis/DETAILS
+++ b/database/redis/DETAILS
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
            SPELL=redis
-         VERSION=2.8.19
+         VERSION=5.0.5
   SECURITY_PATCH=2
-      PATCHLEVEL=1
           SOURCE=$SPELL-$VERSION.tar.gz
    SOURCE_URL[0]=http://download.redis.io/releases/$SOURCE
-     SOURCE_HASH=sha512:34997b45815cfdec9fbb06cd6664ed6ddf71baf064fd9ac155b7b969fd5945f78927cd5dfde83b043dc8ff1d7e35b172b9403cdf6115b8ca7bdf80c581ee9cdd
+     SOURCE_HASH=sha512:78215ec02b7184e05788c7a368146ea53095a877a0e09174b4c9f175aeb9ba9174023c19e33bf62e4513b848e1841538d398e7c0a651c5c947255c1691cb4586
 SOURCE_DIRECTORY="$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-$VERSION"
       LICENSE[0]=BSD
         WEB_SITE=http://redis.io/
diff --git a/database/redis/HISTORY b/database/redis/HISTORY
index 6946adc513..1077140157 100644
--- a/database/redis/HISTORY
+++ b/database/redis/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+2019-05-30 Ismael Luceno <ismael@sourcemage.org>
+	* DETAILS: updated spell to 5.0.5
+	* CLIENT_MASTER.patch, CVE-2013-7458.patch, TALOS-2016-0206.patch,
+	  PRE_BUILD: removed patches, not needed anymore
+
 2017-06-03 Vlad Glagolev <stealth@sourcemage.org>
 	* DETAILS: PATCHLEVEL=1
 	* init.d/redis: use login environment for su to autoset limits
diff --git a/database/redis/PRE_BUILD b/database/redis/PRE_BUILD
index 8270734705..64efed583a 100755
--- a/database/redis/PRE_BUILD
+++ b/database/redis/PRE_BUILD
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
 default_pre_build &&
 cd "$SOURCE_DIRECTORY" &&
 
-patch -p1 < "${SPELL_DIRECTORY}/CVE-2013-7458.patch" &&
-patch -p0 < "${SPELL_DIRECTORY}/CLIENT_MASTER.patch" &&
-patch -p1 < "${SPELL_DIRECTORY}/TALOS-2016-0206.patch" &&
-
 sedit "s:dir ./:dir /var/lib/redis:" redis.conf &&
 
 if [[ $INIT_INSTALLED ]]; then
diff --git a/database/redis/TALOS-2016-0206.patch b/database/redis/TALOS-2016-0206.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0215f5e9a5..0000000000
--- a/database/redis/TALOS-2016-0206.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-Adapted from:
-
-From 6d9f8e2462fc2c426d48c941edeb78e5df7d2977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: antirez <antirez@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 22:48:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Security: CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit overflow
- fixed.
-
-This commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis
-of Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference.
-
-CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class "master"
-which is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The "master" class
-has ID 3. What happens is that the global structure:
-
-    server.client_obuf_limits[class]
-
-Is accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing
-the 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory *after* the end
-of the array, since the structure is defined as:
-
-    typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig {
-        unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes;
-        unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes;
-        time_t soft_limit_seconds;
-    } clientBufferLimitsConfig;
-
-EVALUATION OF IMPACT:
-
-Checking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global
-'server' structure, we find AOF state fields:
-
-    clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];
-    /* AOF persistence */
-    int aof_state;                  /* AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */
-    int aof_fsync;                  /* Kind of fsync() policy */
-    char *aof_filename;             /* Name of the AOF file */
-    int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite;    /* Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. */
-    int aof_rewrite_perc;           /* Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... */
-    off_t aof_rewrite_min_size;     /* the AOF file is at least N bytes. */
-    off_t aof_rewrite_base_size;    /* AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. */
-    off_t aof_current_size;         /* AOF current size. */
-
-Writing to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in
-Redis persistence that should not escalate to security problems.
-However unfortunately writing to "aof_filename" could be potentially a
-security issue depending on the access pattern.
-
-Searching for "aof.filename" accesses in the source code returns many different
-usages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the
-Redis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall.
-
-It looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations
-disclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the
-attacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that,
-it looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used
-to mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF
-data (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here:
-http://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the
-AOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded
-in order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed
-with untrusted input (no known issue known currently).
-
-The fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf in
-order to access configuration data structures, and return an error in
-this cases.
-
-WHO IS AT RISK?
-
-The "master" client class was introduced in Redis in Jul 28 2015.
-Every Redis instance released past this date is not vulnerable
-while all the releases after this date are. Notably:
-
-    Redis 3.0.x is NOT vunlerable.
-    Redis 3.2.x IS vulnerable.
-    Redis unstable is vulnerable.
-
-In order for the instance to be at risk, at least one of the following
-conditions must be true:
-
-    1. The attacker can access Redis remotely and is able to send
-       the CONFIG SET command (often banned in managed Redis instances).
-
-    2. The attacker is able to control the "redis.conf" file and
-       can wait or trigger a server restart.
-
-The problem was fixed 26th September 2016 in all the releases affected.
----
- src/config.c | 8 +++++---
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c
-index 1d81180..8f3b81a 100644
---- a/src/config.c
-+++ b/src/config.c
-@@ -616,8 +616,9 @@ void loadServerConfigFromString(char *config) {
-             unsigned long long hard, soft;
-             int soft_seconds;
- 
--            if (class == -1) {
--                err = "Unrecognized client limit class";
-+            if (class == -1 || class == REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER) {
-+                err = "Unrecognized client limit class: the user specified "
-+                "an invalid one, or 'master' which has no buffer limits.";
-                 goto loaderr;
-             }
-             hard = memtoll(argv[2],NULL);
-@@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ void configSetCommand(client *c) {
-             long val;
- 
-             if ((j % 4) == 0) {
--                if (getClientTypeByName(v[j]) == -1) {
-+                int class = getClientTypeByName(v[j]);
-+                if (class == -1 || class == REDIS_CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER) {
-                     sdsfreesplitres(v,vlen);
-                     goto badfmt;
-                 }